Frontmatter

Translator's Preface

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 26 to 48 of the Ordinatio (aka Opus Oxoniense) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume six of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi. Volume six is the final volume for the distinctions of Book 1. Volume seven begins the distinctions of Book 2.

Scotus’ Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson April, 2013

Titlepage

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Distinctions 26 to 48

Translated by Peter L. P. Simpson

Contents

Book One

Twenty Sixth Distinction

            

Single Question: Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin	Num. 1
I. Opinions of Others
A. First Opinion	Num. 6
B. Second Opinion
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 15
2. Arguments against the Opinion	Num. 32
C. Third Opinion	Num. 56
II. What one Should Think about the Third Opinion	Num. 67
III. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion when Holding the Third Opinion	Num. 73
IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Holding the Second Opinion	Num. 84
V. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 95
VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion	Num. 95

Twenty Seventh Distinction

                       

Question One: Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection	Num. 1
Question Two: Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person	Num. 5
Question Three: Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature	Num. 9
I. To the First and Second Questions
A. The Opinion of Others
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 11
2. Rejection of the Opinion
a. As to the First Question	Num. 16
b. As to the Second Question	Num. 23
B. Scotus’ own Response
1. To the First Question	Num. 42
a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word	Num. 48
b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word	Num. 62
c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word	Num. 79
2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 82
3. To the Second Question	Num. 85
4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question	Num. 88
II. To the Third Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 91
B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus’ own Response Num. 95
C. To the Principal Argument	Num. 98
D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 99
E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word	Num. 103

Twenty Eighth Distinction

                        

Question One: Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is Property of the Father Himself Num. 1
Question Two: Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality	Num. 6
I. To the First Question	Num. 11
A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone	Num. 12
B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father
1. First Opinion	Num. 21
2. Second Opinion	Num. 25
3. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num.27
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 29
II. To the Second Question
A. Opinion of Others	Num. 36
B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 44
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 48
D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 49
Question Three: Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person	Num. 52
I. To the Question
A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations	Num. 56
1. First Opinion	Num. 57
2. Second Opinion	Num. 61
3. Third Opinion	Num. 64
4. Against the Three Opinions together	Num. 68
B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes	Num. 89
C. Scotus’ own Response	Num. 93
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 108

Twenty Ninth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Arguments	Num. 5

Thirtieth Distinction

             

Question One: Whether Some Relation is Said of God from Time	Num. 1
Question Two: Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures	Num. 5
I. The Opinions of Others as to Each Question
A. First Opinion
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 11
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 15
B. Second Opinion
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 24
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 25
II. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question	Num. 30
III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 46
IV. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question	Num. 49
V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question	Num. 59

Thirty First Distinction

         

Single Question: Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 6
A. As to the First Condition for Relation
1. Opinion of Others	Num. 7
2. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 11
B. As to the Second Condition for Relation	Num. 12
C. As to the Third Condition for Relation	Num. 16
II. Doubts about Equality	Num. 19
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 23

Thirty Second Distinction

           

Question One: Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Themselves by the Holy Spirit	Num. 1
Question Two: Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom	Num. 6
I. Opinion of Others to the First Question	Num. 8
A. First Opinion	Num. 9
B. Second Opinion	Num. 12
C. Third Opinion	Num. 14
D. Fourth Opinion	Num. 16
II. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question	Num. 23
III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question	Num. 30
IV. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question	Num. 32
V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 34

Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions

 

Questions One to Three: Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence, and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence

Num. 1

Thirty Fifth Distinction

             

Single Question: Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 7
A. Opinions of Others
1. First Opinion	Num. 9
2. Second Opinion	Num. 12
B. Rejection of the Opinions
1. Against the Common Conclusion	Num. 14
2. Against the First Opinion	Num. 21
3. Against the Second Opinion	Num. 24
C. Scotus’ own Response	Num. 27
D. Instances against Scotus’ own Solution	Num. 35
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 53
III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num. 56

Thirty Sixth Distinction

       

Single Question: Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect	Num. 1
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 4
B. Scotus’ own Response	Num. 26
C. Objections against Scotus’ own Response	Num. 30
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 48
III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others	Num. 54

Thirty Seventh Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether God’s Omnipotence necessarily entails his Greatness	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 10

Thirty Eighth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether God’s Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 11

Appendix

[The second part of Distinction 38
The Infallibility of Divine Knowledge
and the whole of
Distinction 39
The Immutability of Divine Knowledge
are lacking in the Ordinatio and are supplied here by an interpolation from the Lectura
and Rep. 1A.]

                 

Questions One to Five: On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge
I. The Opinions of Others
A. First Opinion
B. Second Opinion
C. Third Opinion
II. Scotus’ own Response to the Questions
A. How there is Contingency in Things
1. Contingency in things is Evident and Manifest
2. The Contingency in Things is because of the Contingent Causation of God
3. The Cause of Contingency in Beings is on the Part of the Divine Will
a. How our Will can be Cause of Contingency in Things
b. How the Divine Will is Cause of Contingency in Things
B. How along with the Contingency of Things there stands the Certainty of Divine Knowledge
III. To the Principal Arguments
IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion
V. To the Authorities of the Saints
VI. To the Arguments for the Third Opinion

Fortieth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether a Predestined Person can be Damned	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 8

Forty First Distinction

         

Single Question: Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation	Num. 1
I. To the Question
A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine Num. 5
B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard	Num. 6
C. Third Opinion	Num. 12
D. Fourth Opinion	Num. 25
E. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 40
F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions	Num. 52
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 53

Forty Second Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 8
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 16B

Forty Third Distinction

     

Single Question: Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of God or of the Makeable Thing Num. 1
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 3
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 14
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 19

Forty Fourth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether God could Make Things other than He has Ordained them to be Made	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides	Num. 13

Forty Fifth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 7

Forty Sixth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether God’s Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 5
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 7

Forty Seventh Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether Divine Permission is some Act of the Divine Will	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 10

Forty Eighth Distinction

   

Single Question: Whether a Created Will is Morally Good whenever it Conforms to the Uncreated Will	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 5